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Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the effect of output quantization on the secrecy capacity of the
binary-input Gaussian wiretap channel. As a result, a closed-form expression with infinite summation
terms of the secrecy capacity of the binary-input Gaussian wiretap channel is derived for the case
when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have unquantized outputs. In particular,
computable tight upper and lower bounds on the secrecy capacity are obtained. Theoretically, we
prove that when the legitimate receiver has unquantized outputs while the eavesdropper has binary
quantized outputs, the secrecy capacity is larger than that when both the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper have unquantized outputs or both have binary quantized outputs. Further, numerical
results show that in the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) (of the main channel) region, the secrecy
capacity of the binary input Gaussian wiretap channel when both the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper have unquantized outputs is larger than the capacity when both the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper have binary quantized outputs; as the SNR increases, the secrecy capacity when
both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have binary quantized outputs tends to overtake.
Keywords: binary input Gaussian wiretap channel; information theoretic security; secrecy capacity;
binary output quantization
1. Introduction
The capacity of the Gaussian channel with binary inputs is a particularly important metric on
the performance of practical communication systems. If there exists an eavesdropper besides the
legitimate users, the capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel is usually studied from the perspective
of information-theoretic secrecy. The concept of information-theoretic secrecy was first introduced by
Shannon in [1], where he proposed a cipher system with perfect secrecy to ensure the confidentiality of
communication. Later, Wyner introduced a wiretap channel in [2] to achieve the information-theoretic
secrecy under a weak secrecy constraint (i.e., the rate of information leaked to the eavesdropper is made
vanishing). In [3], Csiszár and Körner extended Wyner’s work to a general broadcast channel model
with one common message and one confidential message.
In the Gaussian wiretap channel, a wiretapper eavesdrops the communication through another
Gaussian channel. Recently, the Gaussian wiretap channel with constrained/finite inputs has attracted
increasing research attention [4–8]. The closed-form expression of the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian
wiretap channel with continuous input signal was given in [9]. The work in [4] considered the
Gaussian wiretap channel with M-ary pulse amplitude modulation (M-PAM) inputs and established
the necessary conditions for the input power allocation and the input distribution in order to maximize
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the achievable secrecy rate. The effects of finite-alphabet inputs on the achievable secrecy rate of the
multi-antenna wiretap systems were investigated in [5,6].
In this paper, two constraints are imposed on the Gaussian wiretap channel: the input signal
is binary; the output is restricted to the binary quantized output and the unquantized output.
Roughly speaking, the unquantized output is the original continuous channel output signal, while the
binary quantized output is obtained from the binary quantization of the original continuous channel
output. In the binary-input Gaussian wiretap channel (BI-GWC), since the legitimate receiver and
the wiretapper can have either binary quantized outputs or unquantized outputs, there are four cases
under consideration:
1. Both the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper have unquantized outputs;
2. Both the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper have binary quantized outputs;
3. The legitimate receiver has binary quantized outputs, while the wiretapper has unquantized outputs;
4. The legitimate receiver has unquantized outputs, while the wiretapper has binary quantized outputs.
So far, all the known works about BI-GWC [4–6] focus on Case 1, where the classical results
in [2,3,9] were used to optimize the input power and the input distribution. However, no closed-form
expression was derived. For the other three cases, their secrecy capacities have not yet been studied.
In this paper, for Case 1, we give a close-form expression of the secrecy capacity. To reduce the
computational complexity, tight upper and lower bounds on the secrecy capacity are also obtained.
For Case 2, we transform the channel to a binary symmetric wiretap channel, and hence obtain its
secrecy capacity. For Cases 3 and 4, we derive lower bounds on the secrecy capacity, respectively.
Moreover, it is known that the quantized output leads to a lower channel capacity than the
unquantized output does for the binary input Gaussian channel [10]. However, in the binary-input
Gaussian wiretap channel, the problem is whether quantized output would still lead to a lower secrecy
capacity. In this paper, we investigate this problem by comparing the secrecy capacities of these four
cases. We theoretically prove that secrecy capacity for Case 4 is larger than those of Cases 1 and 2.
Further, we observe from the numerical results that the secrecy capacity for Case 1 is larger than that
for Case 2 in the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) (main channel) region; however, the later tends to
overtake when SNR increases. In other words, unlike the binary-input Gaussian Channel, the impact
of quantization of the output signal becomes insignificant in the high SNR region for Cases 1 and 2 of
binary-input Gaussian wiretap channel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Firstly, the system model of the binary-input
Gaussian wiretap channel is introduced in Section 2. Next, the secrecy capacities of the four cases
are studied in Section 3, and the numerical results are demonstrated in Section 4 respectively. Finally,
the conclusion is given in Section 5.
2. System Model
2.1. Gaussian Channel with Binary Inputs
The model of Gaussian channel with binary input is shown in Figure 1. Let X ∈ {+√p,−√p}
be the binary input of the channel, where p is the signal power constraint. The channel output is
described by
Y = X + N,
where N is a Gaussian noise with variance σ2, and N is independent of the channel input X. Without
loss of generality, we assume that N is zero-mean; i.e., N ∼ N (0, σ2). Denote the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) between the input signal and noise as γ , p/σ2.
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X ∈ {±√p} +
N ∼ N (0, σ21)
Y (unquantized output)
X ∈ {±√p} +
N ∼ N (0, σ21)
binary
quantization
Y ′ Y ∈ {±√p}
(binary quantized output)
Figure 1. The Gaussian channel with binary inputs and quantized/unquantized outputs.
In particular, we restrict to two output schemes:
1. Unquantized outputs:
If the channel output signal is directly processed by the receiver without binary quantization
as shown in Figure 1, we call it the unquantized output. The channel output Y is a continuous
signal, having the conditional probability density function
P(Y = y|X = +√p) = 1√
2piσ2
exp[− (y−
√
p)2
2σ2
]
P(Y = y|X = −√p) = 1√
2piσ2
exp[− (y +
√
p)2
2σ2
].
With the unquantized output, a closed-form expression of the channel capacity for the BI-GWC
was given in [11] as
CB(γ) =
[
−
√
2γ
pi
e−
γ
2 + (2γ− 1)Q(√γ) +
∞
∑
k=1
(−1)k
k(k + 1)
Q(
√
γ(2k + 1))e2γk(k+1)
]
log2 e + 1,
(1)
where Q(a) , 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
a e
− x22 dx. This channel capacity CB(γ) is achieved if and only if the input
signal is uniformly distributed [11].
For the sake of simplifying computation in what follows, the channel capacity can be
approximated by keeping the first m terms of the summation as [11]
C(m)B (γ) =
[
−
√
2γ
pi
e−
γ
2 + (2γ− 1)Q(√γ) +
m
∑
k=1
(−1)k
k(k + 1)
Q(
√
γ(2k + 1))e2γk(k+1)
]
log2 e + 1.
(2)
2. Binary quantized outputs:
Through a binary quantization, the binary quantized output is
Y =
{
−√p, if Y′ ∈ (−∞, 0]
+
√
p, if Y′ ∈ (0,∞) (3)
where Y′ is the original continuous channel output signal.
In fact, this case can be modeled as the a binary symmetric channel with transition probability
Q(
√
γ) = p(y = −√p|x = +√p) = p(y = +√p|x = −√p) [10]. By means of the results for
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binary symmetric channel [12], we can obtain the channel capacity for the BI-GWC with binary
quantized outputs as
CH(γ) = 1− h(Q(√γ)), (4)
where h(·) is the binary entropy function. Note that CH(γ) is achieved iff the binary input
distribution is uniform [12].
2.2. Gaussian Wiretap Channel with Binary Inputs
The binary-input Gaussian wiretap channel is shown in Figure 2, where an external wiretapper
eavesdrops the communication through another Gaussian channel. The channel output Y at the
legitimate receiver and the channel output Z at the eavesdropper are described by
Y =X + N1,
Z =X + N2,
where X is the antipodal transmission signal; N1 and N2 are the additive Gaussian noises of the main
channel and the wiretap channel, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that N1 and N2
are zero-mean, and N1 ∼ N (0, σ21 ), N2 ∼ N (0, σ22 ). Then, the SNR of the legitimate channel and the
wiretap channel are γ1 and γ2, respectively. Particularly, we only consider γ2 < γ1, since a reliable
and secure communication is possible only in this case [9].
x ∈ {±√p} +
n1 ∼ N (0, σ21)
Y (legitimate receiver)
+
n2 ∼ N (0, σ22)
Z (wiretapper)
Figure 2. The binary-input Gaussian wiretap channel.
3. BI-GWC with/without Output Quantization
In this section, we study the secrecy capacities of the four cases mentioned in Section 1, which
are denoted by CSS, CHH , CHS, and CSH , respectively. Since only if both the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper have unquantized outputs or both have binary quantized outputs, the original
channel is a stochastically degraded Gaussian wiretap channel (detailed explanation to follow). Then,
we investigate the secrecy capacity of the four cases in two groups.
3.1. Both the Legitimate Receiver and the Eavesdropper Have Unquantized Outputs or Both Have Binary
Quantized Outputs
If both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have unquantized outputs, the difference
between the channel output Y and Z is caused by the the additive Gaussian noise N1 and N2. According
to the assumption γ2 < γ1, the wiretap channel output Z is stochastically degraded of the main channel
output Y, which means that there exists a Z′ such that X → Y → Z′, where Z′ has the same conditional
marginal distribution as Z; i.e., pZ′ |X = pZ|X . Hence, in this case, the binary-input Gaussian wiretap
channel is a stochastically degraded binary-input Gaussian wiretap channel.
If the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have binary quantized outputs (as mentioned
in Section 2.2), the main channel and the wiretap channel are equal to the corresponding binary
symmetric channels with transition probability Q(
√
γ1) and Q(
√
γ2), respectively. Similarly, under
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this assumption γ2 < γ1, this case can be modeled as a stochastically degraded binary symmetric
wiretap channel.
By means of the results of a stochastically degraded wiretap channel [2,3], we can obtain the
secrecy capacities for these two cases, whose proof will given in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. If both the eavesdropper and the legitimate receiver have unquantized outputs or both have binary
quantized outputs, the secrecy capacity of the binary-input Gaussian wiretap channel is
CS = maxpX
[I(X; Y)− I(X; Z)] = Ip∗X (X; Y)− Ip∗X (X; Z)
where pX is the probability distribution of the input signals; p
∗
X is the uniform input distribution.
Based on Theorem 1, we can derive their closed-form expressions in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2,
respectively.
3.1.1. BI-GWC: Secrecy Capacity When the Legitimate Receiver and the Eavesdropper Have
Unquantized Outputs
For this case, we first derive a closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. When both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have unquantized outputs, the secrecy
capacity for the binary-input Gaussian wiretap channel is
CSS = CB(γ1)− CB(γ2), (5)
where CB(γ) is as defined in Equation (1).
Proof. Recall that the channel capacity of the binary-input Gaussian channel with unquantized outputs
is achieved by uniform input distribution [11]. This means Ip∗X (X; Y) = CB(γ1) and Ip∗X (X; Z) =
CB(γ2). Following Theorem 1, we then have
CSS =Ip∗X (X; Y)− Ip∗X (X; Z)
=CB(γ1)− CB(γ2)
According to Theorem 2, we deduce the closed-form expression of the secrecy capacity CSS.
However, CB(γ) contains a summation of infinite series, and so CSS does. In order to give a computable
expression of the channel capacity, we make use of an approximation of CSS by Equation (2); i.e.,
C(m)SS = C
(m)
B (γ1)− C(m)B (γ2). (6)
Specifically, we study the behaviour of C(m)SS (γ) and thus derive upper and lower bounds on CSS
as follows.
Property 1. Let C(m)B (γ) and C
(m)
SS , γ > 0, m = 1, 2, . . ., be defined as in Equations (2) and (6), respectively.
1. Let C(m)B (γ)
′ be the first derivative of C(m)B (γ). Then
C(1)B (γ)
′ > C(3)B (γ)
′ > C(5)B (γ)
′ > · · · > C(2m+1)B (γ)′ > C(2m)B (γ)′ >
· · · > C(6)B (γ)′ > C(4)B (γ)′ > C(2)B (γ)′.
2. The sequence C(2m−1)SS , m = 1, 2, . . . , is monotonically decreasing as m increasing;
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3. The sequence C(2m)SS , m = 1, 2, . . . , is monotonically increasing as m increasing; and
4. Both sequences C(2m−1)SS and C
(2m)
SS , m = 1, 2, . . . , converge to CSS as m→ ∞ :
lim
m→∞C
(2m−1)
SS = limm→∞C
(2m)
SS = limm→∞C
(m)
SS = CSS.
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Property 1.
Corollary 1. CSS can be upper and lower bounded by C
(2m−1)
SS and C
(2m)
SS , m = 1, 2, . . . , respectively, as follows:
C(1)SS > C
(3)
SS > C
(5)
SS > · · · > CSS > · · · > C
(6)
SS > C
(4)
SS > C
(2)
SS .
In fact, Corollary 1 provides computable lower bounds and upper bounds on CSS with low
computational complexity. Note from the Corollary 1, the series CmSS at an even/odd number m of
summation terms results in a lower/upper bound on the channel capacity CSS, which can be arbitrarily
tight provided that m is sufficiently large. As an illustration, in Section 4, we show the upper and the
lower bound are very tight, even for m = 6, 7.
3.1.2. BI-GWC: Secrecy Capacity When the Legitimate Receiver and the Eavesdropper Have Binary
Quantized Outputs
Note that there exists a method in [10] which can be used to transform a binary-input and binary
quantized-output Gaussian channel into a binary symmetric channel. That is, under the assumption
γ2 < γ1, this case can be modeled as a stochastically degraded binary symmetric channel. Based on
the results of a degraded binary symmetric wiretap channel [8], we get its secrecy capacity in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3. The secrecy capacity of the Gaussian channel with binary inputs and binary quantized outputs is
CHH = CH(γ1)− CH(γ2) = h(Q(√γ2))− h(Q(√γ1)), (7)
where Q(a) , 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
a e
− x22 dx, and Q(√γ1) and Q(√γ2) are the transition probabilities of the equivalent
binary symmetric channels of the main channel and the wiretap channel, respectively.
3.2. One of the Legitimate Receiver and the Eavesdropper Has Binary Quantized Outputs and the Other Has
Unquantized Outputs
3.2.1. BI-GWC: Secrecy Capacity When the Legitimate Receiver Has Binary Quantized Outputs and
the Eavesdropper Has Unquantized Outputs
In this case, the channel for the legitimate receiver is equal to a binary symmetric channel, whilst
the channel for the eavesdropper remains a binary-input Gaussian channel. Since the channel cannot
be seen as a degraded one, Theorem 1 is not suitable for this case. Then, we give a lower bound on the
secrecy capacity base on the result of normal broadcast channel [3] as follows.
CHS ≥maxpX |I(X; Y)− I(X; Z)|
+
≥|Ip∗X (X; Y)− Ip∗X (X; Z)|+
(a)
= |CH(γ1)− CB(γ2)|+
,(CHS)lower, (8)
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where |a|+ = max{0, a}; (CHS)lower denotes the lower bound on the secrecy capacity CHS;
and (a) follows from the fact that the uniform input distribution achieves the channel capacity of
CH(γ1) and CB(γ2) [11,12].
3.2.2. BI-GWC: Secrecy Capacity When the Legitimate Receiver Has Unquantized Outputs and the
Eavesdropper Has Binary Quantized Outputs
In this subsection, the case is considered when the legitimate receiver has unquantized outputs,
whilst the eavesdropper has binary quantized outputs. As same as the above case, a lower bound on
the secrecy capacity CSH can be given by
CSH ≥maxpX |I(X; Y)− I(X; Z)|
+
≥|Ip∗X (X; Y)− Ip∗X (X; Z)|+
(a)
= |CB(γ1)− CH(γ2)|+
,(CSH)lower. (9)
where (CSH)lower denotes the lower bound on the secrecy capacity CSH , and (a) follows from the fact
that the uniform input distribution achieves the channel capacity of CB(γ1) and CH(γ2) [11,12].
Based on the secrecy capacities and the lower bounds on the secrecy capacity derived for the four
cases above, we are able to have the following comparison.
Corollary 2. (CHS)lower < CHH , CSS < (CSH)lower.
Proof. Recall that unquantized output leads to a higher channel capacity than quantized output does
for the binary-input Gaussian channel [10]; i.e., CB(γ) > CH(γ) (γ is the SNR of the channel). Then,
applying it to Equations (5), (7), (8), and (9), we have
|CH(γ1)− CB(γ2)|+ < CH(γ1)− CH(γ2), CB(γ1)− CB(γ2) < |CB(γ1)− CH(γ2)|+
That is,
(CHS)lower < CHH , CSS < (CSH)lower.
From this corollary, we see that when the legitimate receiver has unquantized outputs and
the eavesdropper has binary quantized outputs, the secrecy capacity is larger than those when
both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have unquantized outputs or both have binary
quantized outputs. This is because the unquantized output provides a higher channel capacity for the
legitimate receiver while the binary quantized output leads to a lower wiretap channel capacity for
the eavesdropper.
Note that when the legitimate receiver has binary quantized outputs and the eavesdropper has
unquantized outputs, we give a lower bound (CHS)lower on the secrecy capacity, and thus it is not
sufficient to compare with the capacities of the other cases. In addition, it is also hard to compare CHH
and CSS through the closed-form expression. The comparison of CHH and CSS will be given through
numerical results in the next section.
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4. Numerical Results
4.1. Comparison of CSS, CHH , (CHS)lower and (CSH)lower
In this subsection, we give the numerical comparison of the secrecy capacity CSS, CHH , (CHS)lower,
and (CSH)lower. Recall that γ1,γ2 are the SNRs of the legitimate channel and the wiretap channel,
respectively. Denote the SNR gap to be ∆γ = γ1 − γ2.
First, in Figure 3, we evaluate the tightness of the upper and the lower bounds on CSS by plotting
the approximation C(m)SS . The curves of C
(m)
SS for m = 1, 2, 6, 7 are plotted versus γ1. It can be seen that
the gap between the upper and the lower bounds becomes indistinguishable as m increases. Especially,
when m = 6, 7, the gap between C(6)SS and C
(7)
SS is already quite small. This indicates that an accurate
evaluation of CSS can be done with less computational complexity by only involving m ≥ 6 summation
terms in C(m)SS .
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
SNR of the main channel--γ1
-5
-4.5
-4
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
lo
g 2
 
C S
S
CSS
(1)
 --upper bound
CSS
(2)
 --lower bound
CSS
(6)
 --lower bound
CSS
(7)
 --upper bound
1.2 1.25 1.3 1.35
-2.8
-2.75
-2.7
Figure 3. Lower and upper bounds on CSS as ∆γ = γ1/2.
In Figure 4, we compare the C(m)SS , CHH , (CHS)lower and (CSH)lower. C
(7)
SS and C
(6)
SS are plotted as an
upper and a lower bound on CSS, respectively. Moreover, Figure 4 also depicts the approximations on
(CHS)lower and (CSH)lower by m = 6, 7. All the curves are plotted with respect to γ1 with γ2 = ∆γ = γ1/2.
From Figure 4, it is clear that (CSH)lower—as a lower bound on CSH—is strictly larger than both CSS and
CHH . (CHS)lower—as a lower bound on CHS—is strictly smaller than both CSS and CHH . This confirms
the result in Corollary 2. Further, we notice that there is a crossing point where CSS = CHH , and the
secrecy capacity CSS is larger than CHH at low SNR; whilst as SNR increases, CHH overtakes CSS. This
gives a rough numerical comparison of CSS and CHH . In the following subsection, we will give more
details about the comparison of CSS and CHH .
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
SNR
se
cr
e
cy
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ap
ac
ity
 
 
CSS
(7)
CSS
(6)
(CHS)lower,m=7
(CHS)lower,m=6
(CSH)lower,m=7
(CSH)lower,m=6
CHH
Figure 4. Bounds on secrecy capacities of binary-input Gaussian wiretap channel (BI-GWC) as
∆γ = γ1/2. SNR: signal-to-noise ratio.
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4.2. Comparison from the Perspectives of SNR and SNR/bit
In this subsection, we look into the comparison of CSS and CHH from the perspectives of the SNR
and the SNR per bit of the channel to the legitimate receiver. Following the numerical evaluations in
the previous subsection, we use C(6)B (γ) and C
(6)
SS to approximate CB(γ) and CSS, respectively.
Figure 5 consists of two sub-figures to illustrate how the crossing point occurs as ∆γ = γ1/2.
In Figure 5a, we plot the curves C(6)B (γ1) and CH(γ1), which are the capacity of the legitimate channel
with unquantized outputs and with binary quantized outputs, respectively. Correspondingly, the
capacity of the wiretap channel C(6)B (γ2) and CH(γ2) are also plotted. In Figure 5b, the comparison of
the secrecy capacities CSS and CHH are shown versus a series of γ1.
SNR(dB) of the main channel γ1,∆γ= γ1/2
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
ch
an
ne
l c
ap
ac
ity
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
CB(γ1)
CH(γ1)
CB(γ2)
CH(γ2)
unquantized ouput
binary quantized output
(a) The channel capacity C(6)B , CH .
SNR(dB)  of the main channel γ1, ∆γ= γ1/2
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
se
cr
e
cy
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ap
ac
ity
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
CSS
(6)
CHH
(b) The secrecy capacity C(6)SS , CHH .
Figure 5. C(6)B (γ1), CH(γ1), C
(6)
SS ,CHH , ∆γ = γ1/2.
In Figure 5a, C(6)B (γ1), C
(6)
B (γ2), CH(γ1), and CH(γ2) increase with an increasing SNR γ1.
However, this phenomenon does not apply to the secrecy capacities CSS and CHH in Figure 5b.
In fact, as shown in Figure 5b, both CSS and CHH first increase and then decrease with an increasing
γ1. In other words, unlike in the traditional communication scenario, increasing SNR does not always
help to achieve a higher transmission rate when secrecy is also under consideration. The underlying
cause is that CSS is the increase from CB(γ2) to CB(γ1), while CHH is the increase from CH(γ2)
to CH(γ1). However, these two increases do not always result in the increase of CB(γ1) − CB(γ2)
and CH(γ1) − CH(γ2). The crossing point occurs when these two increases CB(γ1) − CB(γ2) and
CH(γ1)− CH(γ2) are the same.
Figure 6 shows the relation between energy and the secrecy capacity. The channel capacities
CB(γ1) and CH(γ1), the secrecy capacities CSS and CHH are plotted against the SNR per bit for
∆γ = γ/2, 3γ/4.
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Figure 6. C(6)B , CH , C
(6)
SS , CHH by SNR/bit, ∆γ = γ1/2, 3γ1/4.
Note that SNR per bit is the energy per bit to noise power spectral density ratio (i.e., EB/N0),
where EB is the average energy per information bit and N0/2 = σ2 is the variance of Gaussian noise of
the main channel. Since EB = P/R and the SNR = ES/σ2 = P/σ2, SNR per bit = EB/N0 is related to
the SNR definition as follows:
EB
N0
=
P
RN0
=
P
2Rσ2
.
Comparing CSS with CB and comparing CHH with CH under the same value, it can be seen how
much extra SNR per bit is needed when considering secrecy. For instance, as shown in Figure 6,
to approach the channel capacity CB = 0.3 bps, the SNR per bit EB/N0 = −0.6141 dB is needed. While
to approach the same secrecy capacity with the unquantized output (i.e., CSS = 0.3 bps), the SNR per
bit EB/N0 = 1.6095 dB is needed. Therefore, the secure communication comes with an additional cost
of more than 2 dB. A similar behavior applies to the case when both the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper have binary quantized outputs.
Besides, as shown in Figure 6, with respect to SNR per bit, CSS and CHH do not increase
monotonically, and this phenomenon is the same as that in Figure 4. Interestingly, as SNR→ ∞ (also
EB/N0 → ∞), we observe that CSS and CHH approach to zero as shown in Figure 6. The underlying
reason is that both CB(γ) and CH(γ) approach to 1 bps for the high SNR region, irrespectively of
unquantized or quantized outputs.
Furthermore, we denote R∗ to be the secrecy capacity and (EB/N0)∗ to be the corresponding SNR
per bit at the crossing point (CSS = CHH). In Figure 6, we observe that R∗ increases with respect to ∆γ,
while (EB/N0)∗ decreases with respect to ∆γ. This indicates a reduction in energy cost per bit and an
increase of the secrecy capacity in case of a weaker eavesdropper (which results in a larger ∆γ).
In addition, since CSS, CHH approach to 0 as EB/N0 → ∞, for an admissible secrecy rate, there
are two possible SNR per bit EB/N0 to achieve it. For the sake of energy saving, a smaller EB/N0 is of
great interest. For instance, if the targeted secrecy rate is less than R∗, then it is possible to achieve the
secure communication with an SNR per bit smaller than (EB/N0)∗.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel under two practical
constraints: (1) binary inputs; and (2) binary output quantization. Consequently, a closed-form
expression for the secrecy capacity was derived when both the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper
have unquantized outputs, and a tight upper and a lower bound on the secrecy capacity were obtained
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with less computational complexity. Besides, lower bounds were provided for other cases. Numerical
results show the comparison of the secrecy capacities of the four cases, and provide insights into the
energy cost for the secrecy.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. For a stochastically degraded BI-GWC with input X, output Y at the legitimate receiver and Z
at the eavesdropper, there exists a Z′ such that X → Y → Z′ forms a Markov chain; and its conditional
marginal distribution pZ′ |X is the same as pZ|X (thus pZ′ is the same as pZ as well). Therefore, we have
I(X; Y)− I(X; Z) = I(X; Y)− I(X; Z′) = I(X; Y|Z′).
Note that I(X; Y)− I(X; Z) is a concave function with respect to the input probability distribution pX ,
since I(X; Y|Z′) is concave with respect to pX by following the proof in Lemma 1 in [13].
Let p∗X be the uniform distribution over the input signals. When both the legitimate receiver
and eavesdropper have unquantized outputs or both have binary quantized outputs, the channel
capacity can be achieved at p∗X . That is, p∗X maximizes I(X; Y) and I(X; Z) simultaneously. Thus it is a
stationary point of I(X; Y)− I(X; Z). In addition to the concavity of I(X; Y)− I(X; Z), we conclude
that p∗X maximizes I(X; Y)− I(X; Z), i.e.,
max
pX
[I(X; Y)− I(X; Z)] = Ip∗X (X; Y)− Ip∗X (X; Z).
Appendix B. Proof of Property 1
Proof. First we prove C(2m+1)B (γ)
′ − C(2m−1)B (γ)′ < 0 as follows:
C(2m+1)B (γ)
′ − C(2m−1)B (γ)′
=
[
C(2m+1)B (γ)− C(2m−1)B (γ)
]′
= log2 e ·
{
(−1)2m
2m(2m + 1)
Q[(4m + 1)
√
γ]e4m(2m+1)γ +
(−1)2m+1
(2m + 2)(2m + 1)
Q[(4m + 3)
√
γ]e4(m+1)(2m+1)γ
}′
=
log2 e
2(2m + 1)
·
{
1
m
Q[(4m + 1)
√
γ]e4m(2m+1)γ − 1
m + 1
Q[(4m + 3)
√
γ]e4(m+1)(2m+1)γ
}′
=
log2 e
2(2m + 1)
·
{
1
m
Q[(4m + 1)
√
γ]′e4m(2m+1)γ + 1
m
Q[(4m + 1)
√
γ](e4m(2m+1)γ)′
− 1
m + 1
Q[(4m + 3)
√
γ]′e4(m+1)(2m+1)γ − 1
m + 1
Q[(4m + 3)
√
γ](e4(m+1)(2m+1)γ)′
}
=
log2 e
2(2m + 1)
·
{
4m + 1
m
Q′(√γ)e4m(2m+1)γ + 4(2m + 1)Q[(4m + 1)√γ]e4m(2m+1)γ
−4m + 3
m + 1
Q′(√γ)e4(m+1)(2m+1)γ − 4(2m + 1)Q[(4m + 3)√γ]e4(m+1)(2m+1)γ
}
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(a)
<
log2 e
2(2m + 1)
·
{
4m + 1
m
Q′(√γ)e4(m+1)(2m+1)γ − 4m + 3
m + 1
Q′(√γ)e4(m+1)(2m+1)γ
+4(2m + 1)Q[(4m + 1)
√
γ](e4m(2m+1)γ)− 4(2m + 1)Q[(4m + 3)√γ](e4(m+1)(2m+1)γ)
}
=
log2 e
2(2m + 1)
·
{
(
4m + 1
m
− 4m + 3
m + 1
)Q′(√γ)e4(m+1)(2m+1)γ
+4(2m + 1)Q[(4m + 1)
√
γ]e4m(2m+1)γ − 4(2m + 1)Q[(4m + 3)√γ]e4(m+1)(2m+1)γ
}
(b)
<0,
where (a) follows from e4m(2m+1)γ < e4(m+1)(2m+1)γ; (b) follows from by 4m+1m − 4m+3m+1 > 0, Q′(a) =
− 1√
2pi
e− a
2
2 < 0, and the property C(2m+1)B (γ) > C
(2m−1)
B (γ) [11], such that Q[(4m+ 1)
√
γ]e4m(2m+1)γ−
Q[(4m + 3)
√
γ]e4(m+1)(2m+1)γ < 0.
Similarly, one can show that
C(2m+1)B (γ)
′ > C(2m)B (γ)
′ > C(2m−2)B (γ)
′.
Thus we have
C(1)B (γ)
′ > C(3)B (γ)
′ > C(5)B (γ)
′ > · · · > C(2m+1)B (γ)′
> C(2m)B (γ)
′ > · · · > C(6)B (γ)′ > C(4)B (γ)′ > C(2)B (γ)′,
i.e., Property 1-1.
Define f (γ) = C(2m+1)B (γ)− C(2m−1)B (γ). By the proof of Property 1-1, we have f ′(γ) < 0. This
implies that f (γ) is monotonically decreasing with respect to γ. Since γ1 > γ2, we have the following:
f (γ1) < f (γ2)
C(2m+1)B (γ1)− C(2m−1)B (γ1) < C(2m+1)B (γ2)− C(2m−1)B (γ2)
C(2m+1)B (γ1)− C(2m+1)B (γ2) < C(2m−1)B (γ1)− C(2m−1)B (γ2)
C(2m+1)SS < C
(2m−1)
SS .
This establishes Property 1-2.
A similar proof applies to establish Property 1-3.
Property 1-4 follows directly by the convergence of C(m)B (γ) as shown in Proposition 3 of [11].
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